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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to 78-2A-3 (2)(a), Utah Code, and 
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does an employee voluntarily quit his/her employment under the Utah 
Employment Security Act when he/she signs a letter of resignation, drafted by the employer, and 
begins work for another employer. 
2. Does an employee leasing company cause or aggravate a separation of 
employment under Rule R562-303-109(l)(a)(i)(B), Utah Administrative Code, when the client's 
owner and alleged on-site supervisor of the leasing company terminates the contract with the 
leasing company, contracts with another leasing company and the initial leasing company has 
expressly reserved the right to fire its employees in the leasing contract. 
3. Does public policy and/or principles of fairness dictate that an employee leasing 
company be relieved of unemployment benefit charges when a client terminates the leasing 
contract, contracts with another leasing company and the initial leasing company offers its 
employees continued employment. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
All of the issues presented for review call for the application of either a statue or 
administrative rule to a specific factual situation and, therefore, are questions of mixed law and 
fact which suggests an intermediate standard of review. Further, the interpretation of the 
1 
applicable statute and rules "require little highly specialized or technical knowledge that would 
be uniquely within the Department's expertise, the above Court may review the administrative 
interpretation with only moderate deference." Pro Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 
P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989); Hurley v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988); Taylor v. 
Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1989). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
Section 35-4-307 
(1) Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows: 
(a) Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period 
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation 
from that employer occurred under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily 
quit employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but 
subsequently requalified for benefits and actually received 
benefits; 
(ii) the individual received benefits following a quit which was not 
attributable to the employer; or 
Section 35-4-405 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting 
period: 
(l)(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in a bona fide, covered 
employment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times 
the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
(b) A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the 
claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
Utah Administrative Code (1996) 
Rule R562-5a-l Voluntary Leaving - General Information 
Voluntary leaving work means that the employee severed the employment 
relationship as contrasted to a separation initiated by the employer. This is true 
regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons were for making the decision 
to leave the work. Voluntary leaving will include not only leaving existing work, 
but also the failure to return to work after a lay-off, suspension, or period of 
absence. . . . Section 35-4-5 requires two standards of consideration following a 
voluntary separation from employment: good cause and equity and good 
conscience. If the claimant fails to establish good cause for leaving work, 
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unemployment insurance benefits will not be denied if a denial of benefits would 
be contrary to the equity and good conscience standard as described in Section 
R562-5a-3. It is necessary to assess the totality of the employment situation. 
Where there are mitigating circumstances it may not be equitable to deny benefits. 
Rule R562-5a-7. Examples of Specific Reasons for Separations. 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of good cause or equity and 
good conscience must be considered in determining eligibility for benefits. The 
following examples do not include all reasons for leaving employment. 
(1) Prospects of Other Work. 
Good cause is established if at the time of separation the claimant had a 
definite and immediate assurance of another job or self-employment that 
was reasonably expected to be full-time and permanent. 
Rule R562-303-109. Relief of Charges to Contributing Employers. 
(1) Under the following circumstances a written request is required for 
relief of charges: 
(a) Separation Issues. 
(i) Relief may be granted based only on the circumstance which caused 
the claim to be filed or a separation which occurred prior to the initial 
filing of the claim... 
(B) The separation from that employer would have resulted in an 
allowance of benefits made under the provisions of "equity and good 
conscience" under circumstances not caused or aggravated by the 
employer. 
(D) The claimant quit work for that employer not because of adverse 
working conditions, but solely due to a personal decision to accept work 
with another employer. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from five decisions entered by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Department of Employment Security in Gerald C. Frisbee, Ivan R. Fackrell David L. 
Reid, James R. Thorpe, and Doran L. Cartmell v. Department of Employment Security, Case 
Nos. 96-A-1580-C 96-BR-171-C 96-A-1276-C 96-BR-25-C 96-A-1283-C 96-BR-286-C 96-
A-1286-C, 96-BR-27-C 96-A-1273-C and 96-BR-293-C. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Gerald C. Frisbee filed for unemployment benefits on February 27, 1996. (R. 002) The 
Utah Department of Employment Security subsequently determined that the benefits paid to 
Frisbee would be charged to Petitioner's benefit account because Frisbee was separated by a 
reduction in force. (R. 005) Petitioner appealed the Department's determination on March 14, 
1996, (R. 006) and a hearing was held on April 11,1996, (R. 012) in which the administrative 
law judge ruled that Petitioner should not be relieved from the charges to its benefit account. (R. 
030) Petitioner then appealed to the Board of Review (R. 032) which issued a decision on 
August 16, 1996, upholding the administrative law judge's previous ruling. (R. 038) 
Doran L. Cartmell filed for unemployment benefits on February 6, 1996. (R. 133) The 
Utah Department of Employment Security subsequently determined that the benefits paid to 
Cartmell would be charged to Petitioner's benefit account because Cartmell was separated by a 
reduction in force. (R. 135) Petitioner appealed the Department's determination on February 21, 
1996, (R. 136) and a hearing was held on March 26,1996, (R. 139) in which the administrative 
law judge ruled that Petitioner should be relieved from the charges to its benefit account. (R. 
154) The Department of Employment Security then requested that the administrative law judge 
reconsider her ruling which prompted a redetermination hearing on May 30, 1996, (R. 180) in 
which the judge upheld her previous ruling. (R. 291-296) The Department of Employment 
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Security subsequently appealed to the Board of Review (R. 297-298) which issued a decision on 
March 18, 1997, reversing the administrative law judge's previous ruling. (R. 327-335) 
Ivan R. Fackrell filed for unemployment benefits on February 6, 1996. (R. 345) The 
Utah Department of Employment Security subsequently determined that the benefits paid to 
Fackrell would be charged to Petitioner's benefit account because Fackrell was separated by a 
reduction in force. (R. 347) Petitioner appealed the Department's determination on February 29, 
1996, (R. 348) and a hearing was held on March 26,1996, (R. 353-358) in which the 
administrative law judge ruled that Petitioner should be relieved from the charges to its benefit 
account. (R. 359-361) The Department of Employment Security then requested that the 
administrative law judge reconsider her ruling which prompted a redetermination hearing on 
May 30, 1996, (R. 180) in which the judge upheld her previous ruling. (R. 291-296) The 
Department of Employment Security subsequently appealed to the Board of Review (R. 297-
298) which issued a decision on March 18, 1997, reversing the administrative law judge's 
previous ruling. (R. 327-335) 
David L. Reid filed for unemployment benefits on February 5, 1996. (R. 384) The 
Utah Department of Employment Security subsequently determined that the benefits paid to Reid 
would be charged to Petitioner's benefit account because Reid was separated by a reduction in 
force. (R. 386) Petitioner appealed the Department's determination on February 21, 1996, (R. 
387) and a hearing was held on March 26,1996, (R. 392-402) in which the administrative law 
judge ruled that Petitioner should be relieved from the charges to its benefit account. (R. 406-
408) The Department of Employment Security then requested that the administrative law judge 
reconsider her ruling which prompted a redetermination hearing on May 30, 1996, (R. 180) in 
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which the judge upheld her previous ruling. (R. 291-296) The Department of Employment 
Security subsequently appealed to the Board of Review (R. 297-298) which issued a decision on 
March 18, 1997, reversing the administrative law judge's previous ruling. (R. 327-335) 
James R. Thorpe filed for unemployment benefits on January 31, 1996. (R. 428) The 
I 
Utah Department of Employment Security subsequently determined that the benefits paid to 
Thorpe would be charged to Petitioner's benefit account because Thorpe was separated by a 
reduction in force. (R. 430) Petitioner appealed the Department's determination on February 21, 
1996, (R. 431) and a hearing was held on March 26,1996, (R. 436-441) in which the 
administrative law judge ruled that Petitioner should be relieved from the charges to its benefit 
account. (R. 442-445) The Department of Employment Security then requested that the 
administrative law judge reconsider her ruling which prompted a redetermination hearing on 
May 30, 1996, (R. 180) in which the judge upheld her previous ruling. (R. 291-296) The 
Department of Employment Security subsequently appealed to the Board of Review (R. 297-
298) which issued a decision on March 18, 1997, reversing the administrative law judge's 
previous ruling. (R. 327-335) 
C. DISPOSITION 
In each one of the cases above the Board of Review held that the Petitioner may not be 
relieved of the charges to Petitioner's benefit account. Petitioner appealed these decisions to this 
Court and this Court ordered the consolidation of the cases on April 23, 1997. (R. 125) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 11,1993, MEI Excavation (MEI) entered into a contract with the 
Petitioner, Professional Staff Management, Inc. ("PSM"), a licensed employee leasing company, 
in which MEI became the "client company" and MEI's employees became employees of PSM. 
(R. 328) On December 9, 1994, MEI and PSM entered into a renewal of the previous contract. 
(R. 260-268) Gerald C. Frisbee, Ivan R. Fackrell, David L. Reid, James R. Thorpe and Doran L. 
Cartmell ("Claimants"), were employees of MEI as of the renewal date of the contract and thus, 
became employees of PSM. (R. 0003, 132, 344, 383, 427) 
2. On approximately May 30, 1993 PSM's representative met with Claimants and 
other MEI employees and explained the employee leasing situation to them and gave each 
employee a copy of PSM's Personnel Policies and Safety Procedures Manual. (R. 190, 357) 
Each of the Claimants, with the exception of Frisbee, signed an Employee Acknowledgment of 
Manual form, which stated that the employee had read and will abide by the policies and rules of 
the manual. (R. 256-259) 
3. On February 17, 1995, MEI terminated its contract with PSM and contracted with 
another employee leasing company, Wasatch Services. (R. 216-217) MEI didn't allow PSM to 
speak to its employees at the MEI location, (R. 019, 147, 356) thus, on or about February 20, 
1995 PSM gave its employees form letters regarding their employment status. (R. 16, 20, 356) 
The letter read as follows: 
I, the undersigned, hereby understand the relationship between my 
employee, Professional Staff Management and M.E.I., a client of 
Professional Staff Management is not going to continue at this time. 
At this time I wish to quit my employment with my employer 
Professional Staff Management and have chosen to accept employment 
with M.E.L 
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In addition I understand that this is of my own free will and that if I 
so choose, I could have continued my employment with Professional Staff 
Management. 
Please allow this to be placed in my permanent employment file 
and accept my resignation. 
I also understand that I am eligible for rehire with Professional 
Staff Management. 
When a client terminates their agreement with PSM, it is PSM's policy to continue the 
employment of employees at that client location by finding work for them with another client 
and having them work at PSM's office in the meantime. (R. 020, 148, 203, 356, 400) Each of 
the Claimants, however, signed and returned this form letter to PSM thus, ending their 
employment with PSM. (R. 01,131,343,382,426) 
4. Claimants continued their employment with MEI and Wasatch Services until 
approximately February 4, 1996, when MEI temporarily laid the Claimants off. (R. 003, 132, 
344, 383, 427) 
5. Claimants subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with the Utah 
Department of Employment Security. (R. 002, 133, 345, 384, 428) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the Utah Employment Security Act and the rules relating thereto, an employer is 
relieved from unemployment benefit charges if the claimant voluntarily left work due to 
circumstances which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35-4-405(1) of the 
Act. Utah courts have defined voluntarily as at the volition of the employee, in contrast to a 
firing or other termination at the behest of the employer. 
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The claimants, in the instant case, at their own volition, signed a letter of resignation and 
commenced employment for another employer. Accordingly, the claimants were the moving 
party in their respective separations in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of 
Petitioner. Therefore, the claimants voluntarily quit their employment under the Utah 
Employment Security Act and Petitioner should be relieved of the unemployment benefit 
charges. 
Under Rule R562-303-109(l)(a)(i)(B), Utah Administrative Code, an employer may be 
relieved from charges if the separation would have resulted in an allowance of benefits made 
under the provisions of equity and good conscience under circumstances not caused or 
aggravated by the employer. Under Rule R562-5a-7(l), Utah Administrative Code, good cause 
or equity and good conscience is established if at the time of separation the claimants had a 
definite and immediate assurance of another job. The claimants in the instant case had definite 
and immediate assurances of other employment and thus, had good cause to separate their 
employment. Nonetheless, Petitioner reserved expressly the authority to fire its employees at the 
MEI location and never impliedly authorized the on-site supervisor to terminate claimant's 
employment relationship with Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner did not cause nor did it aggravate 
the separations of employment thus, Petitioner should be relieved of the unemployment benefit 
charges. 
Finally, public policy and principles of fairness require that those employers who are 
responsible for the unemployment be held accountable and conversely those employers who are 
not responsible for the unemployment be relieved of benefit charges. Petitioner had no control 
over its client's decision to breach the leasing agreement and contract with another leasing firm. 
10 
Moreover, Petitioner never terminated its employees at the MEI location and even offered them 
continued employment. Therefore, public policy and fairness dictate that Petitioner, who had no 
hand the claimant's separation of employment, be relieved of the unemployment benefit charges. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER SHOULD BE RELIEVED OF THE BENEFIT CHARGES BECAUSE 
CLAIMANTS VOLUNTARILY QUIT THEIR EMPLOYMENT WHEN THEY 
SIGNED A LETTER OF RESIGNATION AND BEGAN WORK WITH ANOTHER 
EMPLOYER. 
Claimants severed their employment relationship with Petitioner upon signing a letter of 
resignation and commencing employment with another employer. Accordingly, Claimants 
voluntarily quit their employment and this Court should reverse the Board's decision and relieve 
the Petitioner of the benefit charges. 
Under Section 35-4-307(1), of the Employment Security Act, benefits costs of an 
individual will not be charged to a base-period employer, but will be considered social costs if 
the individual received benefits following a quit which was not attributable to the employer. 
Under Rule R562-303-109, Utah Administrative Code, an employer is relieved from 
unemployment benefit charges if the claimant voluntarily left work for that employer due to 
circumstances which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Subsection 35-4-405(1) of 
the Employment Security Act. Under Section 35-4-405(1), a claimant is ineligible for benefits 
for the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause and for each week 
thereafter until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment. 
In previously construing these pertinent statutes and rules the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "'voluntarily' simply means at the volition of the employee, in contrast to a firing or 
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other termination at the behest of the employer." Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec, 
678 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1984). In Allen v. Department of Employment Sec. 781 P.2d 888 
(Utah App. 1989), this Court held that the employees/Claimants had assented of their own 
volition to the cessation of their employment and that the cessation was voluntary when the 
employees decided to end their failing business by selling the business without the intent of 
remaining employed by the successor employer. Id. at 890, 891. This Court noted that it was 
immaterial whether the successor employer wanted the Claimants to leave or offered to have 
them continue employment. Id. at 891. Likewise, in Lanier v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 694 
P.2d 625 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Board's finding that the employee 
left work voluntarily, at his own volition. Id. at 628. The Court inferred that the employee 
intended to quit based on findings that he and his daughter told a co-worker that he had quit and 
his failure to comply with an employment policy requiring daily notification for absences. Id. 
Analogously, the Claimants in the instant case, were not fired or terminated at the behest 
of Petitioner, rather, of their own volition, assented to the cessation of their employment by 
executing a letter of resignation and accepting employment with Wasatch Service and MEL 
Although the Claimants may not have understood their relationship with the Petitioner prior to 
receiving the resignation letter, the letter was clear enough to notify them of their obligations to 
Petitioner. Moreover, if the Claimants did not understand the letter they should have asked and 
if they did not want to sign the letter and quit employment with Petitioner they should not have 
done so. The purpose of the letter was to give the employees an option of continued employment 
with Petitioner. (R. 147) Accordingly, the Claimants were the moving parties in their 
separations from Petitioner and thus, voluntarily quit their employment under § 35-4-405(1). 
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Therefore, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and relieve the Petitioner of the benefit 
charges. 
II. THE CLAIMANTS VOLUNTARILY QUIT THEIR EMPLOYMENT UNDER 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NEITHER CAUSED NOR AGGRAVATED BY 
PETITIONER RATHER, SOLELY TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT WITH ANOTHER 
EMPLOYER. 
At the time of separation from Petitioner, Claimants had a definite and immediate 
assurance of another job. In fact, Claimants probably were already employed by Wasatch 
Services prior to their separation. (R. 327-335) Nonetheless, Claimants quit for reasons beyond 
the control of Petitioner and therefore, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and relieve 
the Petitioner of the benefit charges. 
Under Rule R562-5a-7(l), Utah Administrative Code, good cause or equity and good 
conscience is established if at the time of separation the Claimants had a definite and immediate 
assurance of another job. Under Rule R562-303-109(l)(a)(i)(B), Utah Administrative Code, 
relief from charges may be granted if "the separation from the employer would have resulted in 
an allowance of benefits made under the provisions of "equity and good conscience" under 
circumstances not caused or aggravated by the employer." 
At the time of separation from Petitioner the Claimants had a definite and immediate 
assurance of another job whether they were already employed by Wasatch Services or going to 
work for MEL Thus, Claimants' benefits were properly allowed under the "good cause or equity 
and good conscience" prong of benefit eligibility. Nevertheless, Petitioner did not cause nor did 
it aggravate the termination of Claimants' employment. The Board's conclusion that Petitioner 
was bound by its alleged on-site supervisor's act in terminating the leasing contract with 
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Petitioner and thus, in effect, terminating Petitioner's employment relationship with the 
Claimants, is not supported by the evidence nor the law. 
A. Petitioner's alleged on-site supervisor had no actual or apparent authority to 
terminate Petitioner's employment relationship with the Claimants and was acting 
as the owner of the client company when he did so. 
Under agency law, an agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's actions 
unless the agent is acting pursuant to either actual or apparent authority. Actual authority 
consists of express and implied authority. Express authority is found where the principal directly 
states that its agent has the authority to execute a particular act on the principal's behalf Implied 
authority, on the other hand, is the authority to perform those acts which are incidental to, or are 
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform, the primary authority expressly delegated 
to the agent. When corporate responsibility is sought for acts of corporate agents under apparent 
authority, liability is based upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the conduct 
of its agent which had led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions. The principal must cause 
the third party to believe that the agent has apparent authority. Thus, the one who deals 
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority despite the 
agent's representations. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Utah 
1988). Moreover, the principal will not be bound by acts of an agent intending to further its own 
self-interest and not those of the principal. Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590 P.2d 1262, 
1264 (Utah 1979). 
The Board never made a finding, nor was there any evidence that Petitioner's alleged on-
site supervisor, MEI's owner, Blaine Moulton, had either actual or apparent authority to 
terminate Petitioner's and Claimants' employment relationship. Rather, the only evidence in the 
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record on the agent authority issue indicates that Petitioner expressly retained the right to fire the 
employees. Under Petitioner's client agreement with MEI, Petitioner was responsible for the 
firing of the employees provided to MEI, while the on-site supervisor had the primary 
responsibility for "hiring, training, evaluating, supervising, and the disciplining" of Petitioner's 
employees. (R. 260, 261) Moreover, the Board acknowledged that Blaine Moulton's act of 
terminating his agreement with Petitioner and contracting with another leasing service furthered 
his self interest and was contrary to Petitioner's interests. (R. 335) Moulton's actions were done 
as the owner of the client company and not as an on-site supervisor. Thus, Petitioner's alleged 
on-site supervisor had no authority to terminate Petitioner's employment relationship with the 
Claimants, therefore, Petitioner did not cause nor did it aggravate the termination of Claimants' 
employment. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and relieve the 
Petitioner of the benefit charges. 
B. Claimants quit their employment with Petitioner solely to accept work with 
another employer. 
Under Rule R562-303-109(l)(a)(i)(D), Utah Administrative Code, relief from charges 
may be granted if "the claimant quit work for that employer not because of adverse working 
conditions, but solely due to a personal decision to accept work with another employer." As 
argued above, the Claimants quit their employment with Petitioner upon signing a letter of 
resignation and beginning employment for another employer. The record is void of evidence of 
adverse working conditions nor did the Board make such a finding. Therefore, the Claimants 
quit work with Petitioner solely for the reason that they had accepted work with another 
employer. Thus, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and relieve the Petitioner of the 
benefit charges. 
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III. PUBLIC POLICY AND PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS DICTATE THAT PETITIONER 
BE RELIEVED OF THE CLAIMANT'S BENEFIT CHARGES. 
Public policy in this state dictates that those who are negligent, commit a crime, or breach 
a contract, etc., shall be responsible for their actions. As stated by the legislature 
"unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this 
state", § 35-4-102, Utah Code, 1996, and those who are responsible for unemployment should 
likewise be held accountable for their actions. Nonetheless, under the Board's decisions, the 
employer responsible for the unemployment is not held accountable while the non-responsible 
employer is held accountable. Petitioner could not control MEI's breach of its agreement with 
Petitioner nor could it control MEI's refusal to allow Petitioner to speak in person to its 
employees at the MEI location. Petitioner, however, in a letter, informed the employees that they 
could resign or continue working for Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's lack of culpability, the 
Board held Petitioner accountable for the benefit charges. As Administrative Law Judge, Lavone 
Liddle-Gamonal, stated in one of her reconsideration decision, "the company who benefits from 
this arrangement is MEI as it shifts the burden of unemployment costs and the like to the leasing 
company." (R. 295) Thus, the employer who aggravated or initiated the termination of 
employment benefits from the Board's decision while the employer who lacks culpability is 
penalized for its efforts in continuing employment. Petitioner should be credited with benefit 
charges when it is the moving party in a termination of employment, but not in a situation as in 
the instant case where Petitioner was not the moving party and had no means with which to 
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protect itself. Thus, public policy and principles of fairness direct that this Court reverse the 
Board's decision and relieve Petitioner of the benefit charges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, Petitioner respectfully requests this court to reverse the decision of 
the Board of Review. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of June, 1997. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA ^""""^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Emma R. Thomas 
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ADDENDUM 
NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY UNDER RULE 24(a)(l 1) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
